Guidance

Chapter 4 - Direct discrimination

Published: 2 October 2024

Last updated: 2 October 2024

On this page

Pages in this guide

This is our updated Code of practice for services, public functions and associations. We are running a consultation on our updates and we need your feedback.

Go to our Code of practice consultation page to give feedback.

Introduction

4.1 This chapter explains what the Act says about direct discrimination in the provision of services, the exercise of public functions and associations for all the protected characteristics covered by this Code. It discusses how the requirement for a comparator may be met. It also refers to provisions in the Act which make it unlawful to treat a mother unfavourably because of her pregnancy and maternity.

What the Act says

4.2 Direct discrimination occurs when a person treats another less favourably than they treat, or would treat, others because of a protected characteristic (s.13(1)).

4.3 Direct discrimination is generally unlawful. However, it may be lawful in the following circumstances:

  • in relation to the protected characteristic of age, where a person is treated less favourably because of age but the service provider, those exercising public functions and associations can show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim (read paragraphs 4.75 to 4.87) (s.13(2))
  • in relation to the protected characteristic of disability, where a disabled person is treated more favourably than a non-disabled person (s.13(3))
  • where the Act provides an express exception which permits directly discriminatory treatment that would otherwise be unlawful (read Chapter 11 and Chapter 13)

What is 'less favourable' treatment?

4.4 To decide whether service providers, those exercising public functions or associations have treated an individual ‘less favourably’, a comparison must be made with how they have treated other individuals or would have treated other individuals in similar circumstances (a comparator can be hypothetical). If the treatment puts the individual at a disadvantage compared with other individuals, then it is likely that the treatment will be less favourable: for example, where a customer is refused service or a person’s membership of a club is terminated. Less favourable treatment could also involve being deprived of a choice or excluded from an opportunity. If the quality of the service being offered or the manner in which it is offered is comparatively poor, this could also amount to less favourable treatment (s.31(7)).

4.5 The term ‘treatment’ includes one-off acts or omissions. It also includes rules and practices and their application in a particular case.

Example

4.6 A security guard in a bar refuses to admit a woman aged 65 saying, ‘Sorry, you are too old’. This is a one-off act and is less favourable treatment of the woman because of her age.

If the bar never admits anyone who is, or appears to be, over 60, this would be an age-based rule or practice that amounts to less favourable treatment because of age.

4.7 Individuals do not have to experience financial loss for the treatment to be less favourable. It is enough that the individual can reasonably say that they would have preferred not to be treated differently from the way service providers, those exercising public function or associations treated – or would have treated – another individual.

4.8 Under the Act it is not possible for service providers, those exercising public functions or associations to balance or mitigate less favourable treatment by offsetting it against more favourable treatment, for example, by offering an alternative service at a discount.

Example

4.9 More men than women are using a council sports centre. The management team wants to encourage more women to use the facilities. They decide to restrict the number of men who can use the gym at popular times. They also offer their male users some vouchers for special training events to compensate. As the restriction only applies to men, they are being treated less favourably because of their sex, regardless of the additional benefit of the special offer.

4.10 For direct discrimination because of pregnancy and maternity, the test is whether the treatment is ‘unfavourable’, rather than ‘less favourable’ (s.17). Hence there is no need for the mother to compare her treatment with that experienced by other service users. Read paragraphs 4.53 to 4.72 for further detail about pregnancy and maternity discrimination.

Segregation

4.11 When the protected characteristic is race, deliberately segregating an individual or group of individuals from others of a different race automatically amounts to less favourable treatment (s.13(5)). There is no need to identify a comparator because racial segregation is always discriminatory. It must be a deliberate act or policy rather than a situation that has occurred inadvertently.

Example

4.12 A youth club has had trouble with racial conflicts between young people. It decides to open on Tuesdays and Thursdays for young Black people only, and on Wednesdays and Fridays for young White people only. As separating users of the club by race is a deliberate policy of the club, this is likely to amount to segregation and would be unlawful.

Example

4.13 At another youth club where all young people are welcome at every session, if Black boys choose to separate themselves from White boys, playing different sports or simply standing together in a group, as this is a choice of the users of the youth club and not an enforced policy of the club, it would not amount to segregation and would not be unlawful.

4.14 Segregation linked to other protected characteristics may amount to less favourable treatment and therefore constitute direct discrimination. Whether this is the case will depend on the circumstances. There is no statutory rule that segregation amounts to less favourable treatment for protected characteristics other than race.

4.15 If the protected characteristic is sex, separating men and women service users may be permitted in certain circumstances (read about exceptions for competitive sport, communal facilities and separate services in Chapter 13).

4.16 There are also exceptions for single characteristic associations (read paragraphs 12.66 to 12.74).

Protected characteristics of the service provider are irrelevant

4.17 Direct discrimination can take place even though service providers, those exercising public functions and associations share the same protected characteristic giving rise to the less favourable treatment with an individual user (s.24(1)).

Example

4.18 After several incidents when the police needed to be called, an Asian café owner refuses to serve Asian young men after 7pm on Friday and Saturday. This is likely to be direct race discrimination even though the owner shares the same protected characteristic (race) with the customers he refuses to serve.

'Because of' a protected characteristics

4.19 ‘Because of’ a protected characteristic has the same meaning as the phrase ‘on grounds of’. The wording asks the question why the alleged discriminator acted as they did, whether consciously or unconsciously [footnote 17].

4.20 The characteristic needs to be the reason for the less favourable treatment but does not need to be the only reason. It is sufficient if the protected characteristic has a significant influence [footnote 18].

Example

4.21 After an incident on a prison wing involving two Sikh and three non-Sikh prisoners, in which prison property was damaged, the prison restricts association time for the two Sikh prisoners but does not impose a similar restriction on the three non-Sikh prisoners. If the religion or belief of the Sikh prisoners is one of the causes of the less favourable treatment, then it does not matter that their recent conduct is another cause.

4.22 In some instances, the reason for the discriminatory treatment will be obvious from the treatment itself. An example would be where service providers, those exercising public functions or associations refuse to serve an individual explicitly because of a protected characteristic [footnote 19].

Example

4.23 A Roma couple are refused service in a pub and they are told this is because the pub has a ‘No Gypsies, Roma and Travellers’ policy. The pub also hangs a sign on the door setting out this policy. It is obvious from the notice on the door and the treatment the Roma couple receive that their less favourable treatment is because of race.

4.24 In other cases, the link between the protected characteristic and the treatment will be less clear. In these cases, it will be important to consider whether the characteristic significantly influenced the thought processes of the alleged discriminator [footnote 20].

Example

4.25 A lesbian couple is seated at a restaurant waiting for a member of staff to take their order. They observe the staff serving other couples who arrived after they did. In this case it will be necessary to look at why the restaurant staff did not serve the same-sex couple to determine whether their less favourable treatment was because of sexual orientation.

4.26 However, direct discrimination is unlawful, no matter what the motive or intention of the service providers, those exercising public functions or associations, and regardless of whether the less favourable treatment of the individual is conscious or not. Service providers, those exercising public functions and associations may have prejudices that they do not admit to themselves or may act out of good intentions. They may simply be unaware that they are treating the service user differently because of a protected characteristic.

Example

4.27 An amateur dramatics association that organises theatre trips for its members turns down an application for membership from a woman with a hearing impairment as they believe she would not get the same benefits as other members. Although the association may be well-intentioned in rejecting her membership application, this is likely to amount to direct disability discrimination.

4.28 Direct discrimination also includes less favourable treatment of a person based on a stereotype relating to a protected characteristic, whether or not the stereotype is accurate.

Example

4.29 A common stereotype is that women are less interested in sport than men. A bank offers male customers the chance to win a ticket to sporting events when they come in to discuss their finances. They do not extend the same opportunity to female customers. This is likely to be less favourable treatment because of sex.

4.30 Service providers, those exercising public functions and associations cannot base their treatment on another criterion that is discriminatory, for example, where the treatment in question is based on a decision to follow a discriminatory external rule.

Example

4.31 A student travel agency is aware that the local university charges international students higher fees than it charges UK students, as provided for in regulations. The travel agency decides to adopt this same approach and offers a special student package holiday priced at £200 for UK students, and £275 for international students. The regulations permitting higher fees for most international students apply only to further and higher educational institutions and do not apply to providers of commercial services. Thus, while the differential fees imposed by the university are authorised in statute, there is no equivalent statutory basis for the travel agency to mirror this difference in treatment. The travel agency’s differential pricing is likely to be less favourable treatment because of non-UK nationality.

4.32 A service user experiencing less favourable treatment ‘because of a protected characteristic’ does not have to possess the characteristic themselves. For example, the person might be associated with someone who has the characteristic (‘discrimination by association’) or the person might be wrongly perceived as having the characteristic (‘discrimination by perception’) [footnote 21].

Comparators

4.33 In most circumstances, direct discrimination requires that the treatment of individuals by service providers, those exercising public functions and associations is less favourable than the way they have treated or would have treated another individual who does not have the protected characteristic (s.13(1)). This other person is referred to as a ‘comparator’.

The purpose of identifying a comparator is to provide an analytical tool for considering whether someone has experienced less favourable treatment because of a protected characteristic. It should be noted that no comparator is needed in cases of racial segregation (read paragraph 4.11) or pregnancy and maternity discrimination (read paragraphs 4.53 to 4.72). Furthermore, identifying a comparator is not always necessary in other cases, particularly if the question of whether the treatment complained of was ‘because of’ a protected characteristic is already answered [footnote 22].

Who will be an appropriate comparator?

4.34 The Act says that when comparing people for the purpose of identifying direct discrimination there must be no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case (s.23(1)). However, it is not necessary for the circumstances of the two people (that is, the service user and the comparator) to be identical in every way. A material difference is one that is significant and relevant [footnote 23].

Example

4.35 A man is not accepted as a member of a prestigious cycling club, and a woman who applied at the same time is accepted. The man has recently bought his first bicycle and the woman has recently cycled from Land’s End to John O’Groats. As a relevant circumstance is cycling experience, which is not the same for the man and the woman, it would not be helpful for the man to choose to refer to the woman as an appropriate comparator. To more effectively test his allegation of direct discrimination, it would be necessary for him to refer to a woman with the same level of cycling experience as an appropriate comparator.

Example

4.36 A woman and her husband play pool to the same standard. They both ask to join their local pub team. The man is accepted but his wife is not as ‘there are no other women playing in their league’. The woman could refer to her husband as a comparator in a claim of direct discrimination because of sex.

Example

4.37 A café allows a person only to drink his coffee in the garden rather than in the main café, because he has a severe facial disfigurement which the café owner thinks might upset other customers. The customer is treated less favourably than another customer who does not have a disfigurement and who is given a choice over where they drink their coffee. The customer without a disfigurement can be used as a comparator in a claim of direct discrimination because of disability.

Hypothetical comparators

4.38 In practice, it is not always possible to identify an actual person whose relevant circumstances are the same, or not materially different, so the comparison will need to be made with a hypothetical comparator.

4.39 In some cases, a person identified as an actual comparator turns out to have circumstances that are not materially the same. Nevertheless, their treatment may help to construct a hypothetical comparator.

4.40 Constructing a hypothetical comparator may involve considering elements of the treatment of several people whose circumstances are similar to those of the claimant, but not the same. Looking at these elements together, a court may conclude that the claimant was less favourably treated than a hypothetical comparator would have been treated.

Example

4.41 A young Black woman enrolled on a 10-week computer course at a private business college. She arrived late for the first three classes. The college manager told her that her late arrival disturbed the concentration of the other students and if she arrived late a fourth time, she would not be able to continue and she would forfeit her fee.

In the absence of an actual comparator the Black student could compare her treatment to that given to two White students in slightly different circumstances. One White student had arrived drunk on two occasions and had disrupted the class for two hours but had not been given a final warning. The other White student on two occasions left the class thirty minutes early which distracted the tutor and the students - she had not been given a final warning either. Elements of the treatment of these two comparators could allow a court to construct a hypothetical comparator to test whether the Black student had been treated less favourably because of race.

Comparators in disability cases

4.42 In disability cases, an appropriate comparator will be a person who does not have the disabled person’s impairment but who has the same abilities or skills as the disabled person, regardless of whether those abilities or skills arise from the disability itself (s.23(2)(a)).

Example

4.43 A disabled man with a chronic heart condition is a member of a tennis club. He asks whether he can join the club’s tournament team but is told his game is not good enough. Another club member with the same ranking as him, who doesn’t have this disability, is selected for the team. This new team member could be a comparator to the man with a disability.

4.44 It is important to focus on those circumstances which are relevant to the less favourable treatment. Although in some cases, certain abilities may be the result of the disability, these may not be relevant circumstances for comparison purposes.

4.45 If disabled claimants cannot bring a claim for direct disability discrimination, they may be able to bring a claim for discrimination arising from disability provided it meets the relevant criteria (s.15). In a claim of discrimination arising from disability, there is no need to compare a disabled person’s treatment with that of another person. It is only necessary to demonstrate that the unfavourable treatment is because of something arising in consequence of their disability. There are other criteria that apply to a claim for discrimination arising from disability. For more information, read Chapter 6.

Comparators in sexual orientation cases

4.46 For sexual orientation, the Act states that the fact that one person is a civil partner while another is married is not a material difference between the circumstances relating to each case (s.23(3)). The Supreme Court has confirmed this [footnote 24].

Example

4.47 A woman who is married books an anniversary holiday with her husband. Because it is her anniversary, the travel agency offers a room upgrade at a reduced price. A woman who is in a civil partnership books an anniversary holiday with her female partner at the same agency, but she is not offered the same upgrade. The fact that the second woman is a civil partner while the first woman is married will not be a material difference in the circumstances, so the second woman would be able to refer to the first as a comparator in this case.

Discrimination by association

4.48 It is direct discrimination if service providers, those exercising public functions or associations treat an individual less favourably because of the individual’s association with another individual who has a protected characteristic. However, this does not apply to pregnancy and maternity. Discrimination by association can occur in various ways, for example, where the individual has a relationship of parent, child, partner, carer or friend of someone with a protected characteristic. The key question is whether the protected characteristic of the other individual was the cause of the less favourable treatment.

Example

4.49 A boy wishes to join his local football club, but he is rejected because his parents are a lesbian couple. This is direct discrimination by association because of sexual orientation due to the boy’s association with his parents.

Example

4.50 A group of four young men try to enter their local nightclub. Three of the men are Polish and one of them is English. They are all told that the nightclub is full and therefore they cannot enter. The doorman then lets a group of four men who are speaking with English accents into the club. The first group could complain that they have all been treated less favourably because of race, the English man because of his association with his Polish friends. If, however, the only reason the group was not admitted was that the three Polish men did not have enough money to pay the admission fee, then the English man could not claim that the reason for his less favourable treatment was race.

Discrimination by perception

4.51 It is also direct discrimination if service providers, those exercising public functions or associations treat an individual less favourably because the service providers, those exercising public functions or associations mistakenly think that the individual has a protected characteristic. However, this does not apply to the protected characteristic of pregnancy and maternity.

Example

4.52 People with certain Irish surnames are subjected to more stringent checks by a holiday company, and then excluded from making holiday bookings because they are assumed to be Irish Travellers. This is less favourable treatment because of race.

Discrimination because of pregnancy and maternity

4.53 The Act provides protection against discrimination because of pregnancy and maternity in the provision of services, the exercise of public functions and in associations (s.17).

4.54 When explaining these provisions we use the same language as the Act, which refers to discrimination against women on the grounds of pregnancy and maternity.

It is possible that a trans man whose legal sex is male - having obtained a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) - could also experience pregnancy and maternity. The courts have ruled that motherhood is defined as having been pregnant and given birth, regardless of whether the person in question is defined as a man or a woman in law [footnote 25].

A trans man who becomes pregnant is likely to be protected under the protected characteristic of pregnancy and maternity [footnote 26].

4.55 It is discrimination to treat a woman unfavourably:      

  • because of her pregnancy
  • because she has given birth, and the unfavourable treatment occurs within a period of 26 weeks beginning with the day on which she gave birth
  • because she is breastfeeding, and the unfavourable treatment occurs within the period of 26 weeks beginning with the day on which she gave birth

4.56 Mothers are protected even if their baby is stillborn, if the pregnancy lasted for at least 24 weeks before they gave birth.

4.57 Outside the 26-week period, a mother may be protected by the sex discrimination provisions (read paragraphs 4.66 to 4.71).

4.58 Any unfavourable treatment will be pregnancy and maternity discrimination if the treatment would not have taken place but for the woman’s pregnancy, the fact that she has given birth within the previous 26 weeks or that she is breastfeeding a baby that is not more than 26 weeks old.

What does 'unfavourable' mean?

4.59 For pregnancy and maternity discrimination to occur, a mother must have been treated ‘unfavourably’. This means that the treatment must result in a detriment or disadvantage. If the detriment is obvious, it will be clear that the treatment has been unfavourable. For example, she may have been denied a service, given a poorer service or have been provided with a service in a different manner than she would have been, were it not for her pregnancy or maternity.

4.60 Being denied a choice or being excluded from an opportunity is also likely to be unfavourable treatment. Even if a service provider, person exercising a public function or an association thinks that they are acting in an individual’s best interests, denial of, or exclusion from, a service, public function or association may still amount to unfavourable treatment because of pregnancy or maternity, including breastfeeding.

Example

4.61 A cashier, concerned about what she perceives to be the possible risks of non-prescription medicine for pregnant women, refuses to sell paracetamol to a pregnant woman. This is likely to be unfavourable treatment because of pregnancy. As the cashier does not refuse to sell paracetamol or other goods to other people with other physical conditions, she cannot rely on the health and safety exception (paragraphs 13.140 to 13.149).

The meaning of ‘because of’ in relation to pregnancy and maternity

4.62 ‘Because of’ in this context should be understood in the same way as ‘because of’ in relation to direct discrimination, discussed in paragraphs 4.19 to 4.32). Pregnancy and maternity needs to be a cause of the unfavourable treatment but does not need to be the only cause – it is sufficient if pregnancy and maternity has a significant influence [footnote 27].

The motive of the service provider is irrelevant, and it does not matter if the unfavourable treatment is intended or not.

Example

4.63 A woman applies for a mortgage from her local building society and reveals that she is pregnant. She is subsequently refused a mortgage and asks for an explanation. The loans manager says that they are concerned that she may not be able to maintain repayments and mentions several concerns including her pregnancy. The refusal is likely to be pregnancy discrimination.

4.64 Pregnancy and maternity discrimination includes unfavourable treatment of a woman based on an assumption or stereotype about pregnancy or maternity, whether or not it is accurate.

Example

4.65 A club that organises salsa dance evenings deletes a woman from their list as soon as they learn that she is pregnant, on the assumption that pregnant women do not take part in active exercise of this type, and so during her pregnancy she will not want to come to salsa evenings. This decision, resulting in unfavourable treatment based on a stereotype, is likely to be pregnancy discrimination.

Pregnancy and maternity discrimination beyond the protected time period

4.66 The protected period in relation to pregnancy and maternity is 26 weeks. If a woman is treated less favourably because she is breastfeeding after the 26 weeks, this would still be unlawful but her claim would be direct sex discrimination, rather than pregnancy and maternity discrimination, as she is outside of the protected period.

4.67 Where the claim is direct sex discrimination, she will usually need to show that she has been treated less favourably than others are, or would be, treated in comparable circumstances and so a comparator will need to be identified. As this is a claim for direct sex discrimination, the appropriate comparator is likely to be a man. For more discussion of comparators, read paragraphs 4.32 to 4.47.

4.68 Where the factual circumstances of a claim make it difficult for a woman to make a comparison with a man, courts will sometimes remove the comparator requirement and simply consider whether the less favourable treatment experienced by the woman was because of her sex [footnote 28].

4.69 Conduct relating to breastfeeding may also constitute unlawful harassment on the grounds of sex, read Chapter 8 for more information [footnote 29].

4.70 In considering discrimination against a man, it is not relevant to consider any special treatment given to a woman in connection with pregnancy or childbirth.

Example

4.71 A large department store provides a private resting area for women who are pregnant or breastfeeding. A man, feeling tired, complains that he does not have access to a similar facility. This is not discrimination because special treatment for pregnancy and maternity cannot be taken into account in relation to sex discrimination.

Exceptions for pregnancy and maternity

4.72 Read Chapter 13 for the limited circumstances in which a service provider or an association may treat a woman differently because of pregnancy and maternity, by refusing to provide a service or offering or providing it conditionally.

Direct age discrimination

4.73 A different approach applies to age, compared to other protected characteristics, in that less favourable treatment because of age is not unlawful if the treatment can be objectively justified (s.13(2)).

4.74 Whether less favourable treatment because of age, including an age-based rule or practice, is objectively justified depends on whether it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Read paragraphs 5.52 to 5.58 of Chapter 5 for more information on proportionality.

The legitimate aim

4.75 If the treatment is less favourable because of age, it can only be justified if it has a legitimate aim. The range of aims that can justify direct age discrimination is narrower than the range of aims that can justify indirect discrimination [footnote 30]. In the context of direct age discrimination, aims must be socially positive, or in the public interest, to be legitimate. Although reasonable business needs and economic efficiency may be legitimate aims, there would need to be wider social factors too if they are to be justified.

4.76 The following are examples of aims that are likely to be legitimate:

  • enabling people of particular age group(s) to socialise together, for example, outings, events or concerts
  • enabling people of particular age groups to enjoy activities together, for example, hiking or sports
  • ensuring the health and safety of individuals, provided risks are clearly specified
  • preventing fraud or other forms of abuse or inappropriate use of services or functions provided by the service providers, those exercising public functions and associations
  • ensuring the wellbeing or dignity of those using the services, public functions or members of associations
  • ensuring that services, public functions and associations are targeted at those who most need them

Example

4.77 A local rambling club sets up regular weekend walks for under 25s. The club wants to promote a healthy lifestyle for members of this age group, as well as giving them an opportunity to socialise with people of a similar age. These aims would be legitimate.

Example

4.78 A local authority develops a contract specification to commission a day centre service primarily targeted at people aged 75 and over. Evidence suggests people in this age group are more likely to benefit from the centre because of social isolation and physical or mental health conditions. Ensuring that appropriate services are available for this age group would be a legitimate aim.

 4.79 At the time of the alleged discrimination, service providers, those exercising public functions and associations are not required to have in mind the aim that they put forward in justification. However, it is good practice for them to keep a record of their aim and justification, including any supporting evidence, at the time they adopt a rule or practice that treats certain service users less favourably than others because of age.

What is proportionate?

4.80 It is not enough just to have a legitimate aim; it is also necessary for the means of achieving the legitimate aim to be proportionate. Proportionality requires a balancing exercise between the aim sought to be achieved and the discriminatory effect it may have. The disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.

4.81 Proportionality is explained in more detail in Chapter 5 (read paragraphs 5.52 to 5.58).

Example

4.82 With the aim of providing safe flying lessons, a flying club picks 59 as an upper age limit. The club will need to be able to show that imposing this age limit was proportionate to achieve the legitimate aim of safety. As the aircraft used for the lessons are dual control machines and people taking lessons are accompanied by an instructor, the means adopted are unlikely to be proportionate to achieve the aim of maintaining safety.

4.83 The greater financial cost of using a less discriminatory approach cannot by itself provide a justification for less favourable treatment because of age [footnote 31].

Public sector equality duty and justification of less favourable treatment of age

4.84 Where a public authority is seeking to justify less favourable treatment because of age, evidence of how they have had regard to the issues under their public sector equality duty is likely to be relevant (s.149).

4.85 To comply with the duty, a relevant body needs to have sufficient evidence of the impact of its policies and practices on people with different protected characteristics, including age. Having a reliable evidence base allows a body subject to the duty to consider whether there are ways of mitigating any adverse impact that the evidence identifies.

More favourable treatment of disabled people

4.86 In relation to direct disability discrimination, the Act only protects disabled people, so it is not direct discrimination to treat a disabled person more favourably than a non-disabled person (s.13(3)).

For information on indirect discrimination provisions, read Chapter 11.

Example

4.87 For a special exhibition, a museum offers a concessionary entrance fee for disabled people and on Tuesdays and Thursdays has advance viewing sessions so disabled people and their carers can enter the exhibition 30 minutes before other ticket holders. This would not amount to direct discrimination because of disability.

Advertising an intention to discriminate

4.88 If a service provider advertises that in offering a service they will treat applicants less favourably because of a protected characteristic, this would amount to direct discrimination. The question of whether an advertisement is discriminatory depends on whether a reasonable person would consider it to be so. An advertisement can include a notice or circular, whether to the public or not, in any publication, on radio, television or in cinemas, via the internet or at an exhibition.

Example

4.89 A nightclub announces on local radio that women will be admitted free that evening, but men will still pay the normal £5 entry fee. A reasonable person is likely to consider this as advertising an intention to discriminate because of sex.

Chapter 4 footnotes

  1. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Khan [2001] UKH
  2. Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [2000] 1 AC 501
  3. Reynolds v CLFIS (UK) Ltd and others [2015] EWCA Civ 439
  4. Reynolds v CLFIS (UK) Ltd and others [2015] EWCA
  5. Bennett v Mitac Europe Ltd [2022] IRLR 2
  6. Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] ICR 337
  7. Price v Powys County Council [2021] ICR 1246
  8. Bull & Another v Hall & Another [2013] UKSC 73
  9. R (McConnell) v Registrar General for England and Wales [2020] EWCA Civ 559 at [14] and [28]-[39]
  10. For Women Scotland v The Scottish Ministers [2023] CSIH 37 P578/22
  11. Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [2001] 1 AC 501
  12. Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] IRLR 285, HL and Page v NHS Trust Development Authority 2021 ICR 941
  13. Mellor v MFG Academies Trust 1802133/2021
  14. Seldon v Clarkson Wright & Jakes [2012] UKSC 16
  15. Woodcock v Cumbria Primary Care Trust

Page updates

Published:

2 October 2024

Last updated:

2 October 2024