Protecting the right to express beliefs

Can a religious belief be expressed at work?

Ms Eweida was employed as a British Airways (BA) check-in clerk. As a devout Christian she wore a cross on a chain around her neck, initially concealed under her uniform. In May 2006 Ms Eweida started to wear the cross over her uniform as a sign of commitment to her faith.

This was in contravention of BA’s uniform policy and Ms Eweida was suspended from work when she refused to stop wearing the chain at work for religious reasons. However, in February 2007 BA changed its policy to allow the display of religious and charity symbols and staff were allowed to wear items such as the cross and the Star of David. Ms Eweida returned to work but BA refused to compensate her for lost earnings during the period of suspension.  

She brought claims including indirect religion or belief discrimination and sought compensation for the period of time she was without pay. In particular she claimed that the company had indirectly discriminated against her because its uniform policy put her, on the basis of her Christian beliefs, at a particular disadvantage compared to colleagues with other beliefs, and this could not be justified. Her claims were rejected by the UK Courts.

At the time this case was brought, the legal protections offered by the Human Rights Act and the Equality Acts in relation to religion or belief were relatively new.

In 2012, we therefore committed to promoting better understanding of the law in this area and clarifying complex issues.

When this case went to the European Court of Human Rights, we intervened, using our powers under section 30 of the Equality Act 2006  to help clarify whether the claimant’s right to express her religious belief was adequately protected under UK domestic law.

The ECtHR held that the UK courts  had correctly considered her right to manifest her religious belief and the company’s interest in preserving its corporate image as factors to weigh into the balance.

However, they had failed to strike the right balance as they had accorded the factor of the company’s desire to preserve its corporate image too much weight.

Ms Eweida’s discreet cross could not have detracted much from her corporate appearance and there was no evidence that allowing the wearing of religious dress on previous occasions had detracted from BA’s brand or corporate image.

In circumstances where there was no evidence of encroachment on the interests of others, the state had failed to adequately protect Ms Eweida’s right to freedom of thought conscience and religion under Article 9.

This case provided more clarity to those who wish to express a religious belief at work.